

# THE NATIONAL SPIRIT in The Modern World

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*This penetrating and illuminating essay by Mr. J. A. R. Marriott is complementary to those contributed to our first volume by Sir Arthur Keith and Mr. Romaine Paterson. The one gave an outline of racial origins and explained how man emerged from the horde at the call of the tribal spirit; the other showed how the successive industrial agglomerations of mankind that constituted the great States of the ancient world flourished and decayed under the pressure of conflict and cooperation. In the accompanying chapter Mr. Marriott completes the survey by analysing the spirit of nationality, the most potent and the most elusive of the forces that have moulded our modern polity*

THE Nation-State is the typical political product of the modern world. To the ancient world, Nations were by no means unknown; nor were States. But the State rarely corresponded with the Nation. The characteristic political entity was something either much larger or much smaller than the typical modern State: either an empire or a city; the City-States of Hellas, for example; the Empires of Assyria, Macedon, or Rome. The idea that a State should be, even roughly, coextensive and coincident with a Nation did not enter the political consciousness of mankind until towards the end of the eighteenth century. Some authorities would date the new conception specifically from the annihilation of Poland. The partition of Poland among its three powerful neighbours wiped out a State which had filled an imposing place in the European polity; it served to revivify a nation. That nation has now achieved its ambition in a resuscitated Poland.

## Elusive Nature of Nationality

Among the forces which have gone to the moulding of our modern polity, that of nationality is certainly the most elusive. It has almost defied definition. Vico defined a nationality as "a natural society of men who by unity of territory, of origin, of custom, and of language, are drawn into a community of life and of social conscience." Is "unity of territory" essential to the idea of nationality?

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Or even "community of life"? If so, we must deny specific nationality to the Jews in dispersion or to the Poles after the partition of their State. Is identity of language essential, or of religion? If so, we must deny the existence of a Swiss nationality, for the "Swiss" embrace two, if not three, creeds, and speak three, if not four, distinct languages. And what of the "Americans"?

## Nationality a Collective Conscience

Plainly, we shall involve ourselves in difficulties if we lay over-much emphasis either on religion or on language as essential elements. Yet in the absence of these it would seem difficult to preserve nationality when it is divorced from statehood. Swiss nationality and American nationality are respectively the resultant of the evolution of a Swiss State and of an American State. In other cases the State may be a resultant of the idea of common nationality. The Triune Kingdom, commonly designated Yugo-Slavia, and the new Poland are apposite illustrations of the latter process. We seem, therefore, to be almost driven by exclusions and inclusions to acceptance of the definition proposed by Professor Henri Hauser of Dijon: "Nationality is a matter of collective conscience, of collective will to live. . . Race, religion, language, all these elements either are or are not factors in nationality according to whether they

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do or do not enter into the collective conscience by virtue thereof." ("The Principle of Nationalities," page 7.)

A "collective conscience." But the doubt obtrudes itself whether such a conscience could have been generated without a sentimental or traditional attachment to a territorial home. Jewish nationality has been sustained during two thousand years of exile, mainly, no doubt, by devotion to a particular creed, by wonderful persistency of blood, but not least by collective affection for the common home of the race: "When I forget thee, O Jerusalem." But for Zionism the modern Palestine would never have been called into being by the Paris Conference. Similarly the Poles in dispersion have drawn their inspiration from the fact that many of their brethren have lived on, though under alien rule, on the plains of the Vistula.

### **Professor Zimmern's Definition**

Professor Zimmern, then, would seem to get near to the heart of the matter when he writes: "Nationality is more than a creed or a doctrine, or a code of conduct, it is an instinctive attachment; it recalls an atmosphere of precious memories, of vanished parents and friends, of old customs, of reverence, of home, and a sense of the brief span of human life as a link between immemorial generations spreading backwards and forwards. . . . It implies a particular kind of corporate self-consciousness, peculiarly intimate, yet invested at the same time with a peculiar dignity. . . . and it implies, secondly, a country, an actual strip of land associated with the nationality, a territorial centre where the flame of nationality is kept alight at the hearth fire of home." ("Nationality and Government," pages 78, 84.)

### **Beginnings of the States System**

Yet if the idea of nationality be elusive, it is plainly among the most potent of the formative forces of to-day. For the evolution of the modern States

system we must, however, go farther back than the genesis of the idea of nationality. Among the great States of the modern world England was three hundred years ahead of the rest in the realization of its unity and identity. The sense of nationality in England was due, however, to causes, geographical and political, which were unique in their operation. Hardly was there a king of the English before he put forward a claim to be "alterius orbis Imperator" —outside the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire, and, indeed, of the Roman Papacy. Continental Europe was, during the thousand years which intervened between the fall of the Roman Empire and the disruption of Christendom, a quasi-unity dominated in theory by the conjoint authority of pope and emperor, and, in fact, unified by common subjection in ecclesiastical affairs to the Roman Primacy, by common acceptance in the civil sphere of Roman law, and by an all-pervading and all-powerful social system which provided at once a system of land tenure, a nexus for society and a method of government. The Empire, the Papacy, and the feudal system dominated the life of the Middle Ages, and so long as that domination persisted there was no room for the idea of nationality, nor could the modern States system emerge.

### **Evolution of the Nation-State**

The intellectual, political, geographical and ecclesiastical upheaval which is compendiously described as "The Renaissance and the Reformation," opened the door to the emergence of national Churches and the evolution of the Nation-State. Hungary, Poland, and Bohemia had long enjoyed the dignity of statehood. Among the great States of Western Europe, France was (after England) the first to achieve unity and self-conscious identity. The remarkable astuteness of a long succession of kings of the Capet and Valois dynasties; the absorption by conquest or marriage of the great feudal duchies

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and counties ; frontiers well defined on two sides though highly debatable on a third ; an administrative system ever increasing in efficiency as it increased in centralisation ; the Hundred Years War against the Angevin kings of England and the dukes of Burgundy—all these played their part in the making of modern France, and by the end of the fifteenth century France had arrived.

Spain reached a similar stage of national evolution early in the sixteenth century. The secular crusade against the Saracens was the central fact in the making of Spain, but King Charles I., otherwise known as the Emperor Charles V., was the first Spanish sovereign to rule over a united Spain. The bitter contest between Spain and the provinces of the Low Countries gave to the seven northern provinces sufficient cohesion and self-consciousness to entitle them to be regarded as a Nation-State from the end of the sixteenth century onwards, albeit a State of a federal rather than a unitary type. Differences of creed between the Dutch and their former rulers at once fortified them during the struggle for independence and accentuated the sense of unity when independence was at last achieved.

### **European Politics and Antagonisms**

Ecclesiastical antagonisms contributed once more to the many disruptive forces which during the Thirty Years War (1618-48) dissipated whatever of unity Germany had derived from the coincidence of the German kingship and the Holy Roman Empire. From the chaos there emerged more than one powerful State. First "Austria," conglomerate in itself and dynastically connected with the Czech Kingdom of Bohemia and the Magyar Kingdom of Hungary ; then Prussia ; but neither could be described with accuracy as a Nation-State ; still less could the lesser German States, such as Saxony, Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, or the Palatinate, though all were virtually independent sovereignties.

Portugal had meanwhile (1640) regained its independence, and thenceforth must be counted as a Nation-State, while the dissolution of the Union of Calmar (1523) permitted Sweden to take its place as an independent "Power," and for a brief period (roughly 1600-1721) to play a conspicuous and influential part in European politics. Thanks, indeed, partly to the vigour of her kings and the skill and discipline of her soldiers, in part to the friendship which so long subsisted between Stockholm and Paris, Sweden occupied in the European polity a place far more than commensurate with her permanent strength and resources.

### **Growth of Powers in Modern Times**

The rapid rise of the Hohenzollern power in Prussia and North Germany, still more the irruption of Russia into European politics at the close of the seventeenth century, brought to an end the brief ascendancy of Sweden. Russia, though loosely compacted, took her place as a Nation-State in the first years of the eighteenth century, and before the century closed the American continent had brought to the birth the first of the Nation-States in the New World.

How far had the idea of nationality contributed to the establishment of these Powers of the modern world ? The instinctive avoidance of the word "nations," the substitution of the term "Powers" would seem to suggest a partial answer to the question.

### **Monarchical Factor in State Making**

The motive force which was on every side operating to produce a new States system, which found its manifestation in the creation of strong, compact, homogeneous kingdoms, was primarily dynastic, or at least monarchical. France was made by a succession of great kings and great ministers, the apotheosis of the absolute monarchy being reached in the brilliant period which culminated

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in the reign of "Le Roi Soleil" (Louis XIV.). By the end of the seventeenth century France was, however, indisputably a Nation-State. Richelieu had completed the work of political unification, Colbert had made her one commercially and economically, yet the social fissures were still deep. Not until the Revolution did France become a social unity. In two ways Richelieu left his work incomplete. The destruction of political feudalism served only to accentuate the social cleavage between class and class. Nor did he achieve his ambition in regard to the rectification of the frontiers of France.

### **Expansion of the Kingdom of France**

According to his political testament his aim was to identify modern France with ancient Gaul. His intervention in the Thirty Years War wrung from the Empire a formal acknowledgment of the cession of the three Lorraine bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, annexed in 1552, and, in addition, the greater part of the province of Alsace. For the first time modern France touched the Rhine. The acquisition of Franche Comté in 1674 rendered still more isolated the remaining portions of Lorraine, but these did not actually fall into France until 1766. Meanwhile, Henri IV. had brought to the Crown of France the Kingdom of Béarn, or the northern half of Navarre, and Louis XIV. finally rounded off the Pyrenean frontier by the acquisition of Roussillon and Cerdagne in 1659.

### **Result of Territorial Acquisitions**

By a curious legal subterfuge—the Chambre des Réunions—Strasburg was assigned to France in 1683. Later in the same reign the north-eastern frontier was immensely strengthened by the acquisition of Western Flanders, and of a number of strong fortresses like Lille, Cambrai, and Valenciennes, which virtually gave France the command of Artois and Hainault. Louis XIV never

dreamt of invoking the principle of nationality to cover these territorial acquisitions. The motive was frankly strategical, to render France secure against attack by her neighbours; to give France a military advantage should she desire to take the offensive. Of the doctrine of "nationality" there is not a hint; yet the fact remains that before the process of territorial unification began the French were not a nation; when it was complete they unquestionably were. Bretons and Burgundians, Normans, Angevins and Acquitainians alike acknowledged themselves to be "Frenchmen," and found satisfaction and pride not merely in common citizenship but in common nationality.

We pass from modern France to modern Spain. The two outstanding characteristics of the Spaniard—his intense nationalism and his persistent provincialism—are both attributable to his prolonged contest with the Moors.

### **Nationalism Forged by Patriotism**

No people in the world have developed a deeper sense of national individuality than the Spanish, yet between province and province—notably between Castile, Aragon, and Catalonia—there are differences of tradition and outlook which political unification has not availed to eradicate. Probably nothing less than a secular crusade against an intruding enemy, alien in race and alien in creed, would have sufficed to weld Catalans and Castilians, Aragonese and Andalusians into a united nation.

Dutch nationalism is the product of a struggle not less fierce than that in which Spanish nationalism was conceived—on the one hand a prolonged contest waged with the elemental forces of nature; on the other a brief, but terrible struggle against the tyranny, ecclesiastical, economic, administrative, and political, of the Spanish rulers of the Netherlands.

Dutch nationalism was forged in the furnace of persecution; it has been sustained by the necessity for ceaseless

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vigilance against the ambition of powerful neighbours, and against the constantly threatened depredations of the sea.

The people who achieved so splendidly their own liberty showed themselves curiously inept in dealing, at a critical juncture, with neighbours who might, by tactful handling, have been converted into fellow-citizens.

The idea of creating a substantial buffer state between France and Germany has commended itself for centuries to the diplomats of Europe. In the fifteenth century it seemed not unlikely that under the Duchy of Burgundy it might prove effective. It was not to be. In the early nineteenth century, after Napoleon had demonstrated afresh the traditional anxiety of France to extend her eastern frontier to the Rhine, the diplomats at Vienna attempted to achieve the same purpose by uniting the southern provinces of the Low Countries with the northern: the "Austrian" (formerly the "Spanish") Netherlands with those portions of the same low-German lands which, since the end of the sixteenth century, had been distinctively known as the United Provinces.

### **Belgium's Soul Born of Suffering**

The project was initiated by Lord Castlereagh, who in this was true to the secular traditions of British policy. He attempted by the union of Holland and Belgium to erect a stout barrier against the aggressions either of French or Germans. But the Dutch played their cards badly. The Belgians were bitterly offended by the tactlessness and greed of their Dutch sovereign, and the union lasted no more than fifteen years (1815-30). With the successful assertion of Belgian independence, yet another Nation-State took its place in the European polity.

Hardly, however, can the independence of Belgium be hailed as a triumph for the principle of nationality. Between the Flemings and Walloons there is racially less in common than

between those peoples and the French and the Germans respectively. Yet common citizenship in the Belgian State has developed among the people of both races a sense of a common Belgian nationality. The brutality of the German conquest (1914) quickened and accentuated a process which otherwise might have tarried. Nationality matures rapidly under the heel of an alien and oppressive ruler. In the discipline of suffering, Belgium found her soul.

### **Autocracy versus Democracy**

Among the phenomena of European history and politics there is none more curious than the prolonged existence of the "ramshackle empire" of the Hapsburgs and the survival of Switzerland. Between the two political formations there is at once an obvious contrast and a striking parallelism. The one stood as a symbol of autocracy; the other is hailed as the purest extant product of unadulterated democracy; the one represents the triumph of personal rule, and the fruit of "personal union"; the other is a confederacy of free peoples, a union of self-governing and jealously independent communities. Not less striking is the parallelism. Both have fulfilled a definite political purpose, yet both are defiant of every canon of political science. If the Hapsburg emperor ruled over peoples of diverse races—Germans, Czechs, Poles, Magyars, Rumanians, Italians, and Southern Slavs—the Swiss Confederation embraces with impartiality Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians. But an outstanding difference remains to be noted.

### **Ramshackle Empire of the Hapsburgs**

The prolonged and, on the whole, adroit regime of the Hapsburgs did nothing to promote even a pseudo-nationality among the various peoples included in their conglomerate empire. These all remained to the end as distinct as on the day when they severally passed under the rule of the Hapsburgs.

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The Swiss Confederation is equally defiant of the community of race and of language, and even more defiant of community of creed; yet the Swiss are undeniably a nation; the subjects of the Hapsburg empire never were.

### **Debt of the Nations to Napoleon**

The fact emerges, then, that the force to which so much potency is attributed by modern philosophers played an insignificant part in moulding the fortunes of the European States. Thus far, however, we have not crossed—save to indicate the genesis of Belgium—the watershed of modern history. The twenty-six years which elapsed between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the final overthrow of Napoleon mark a distinct dividing line between two historical epochs. The French Revolution proclaimed the principle of liberty. Napoleon, his aggressive enterprises, his conquests, his occupations, his administration, and his codes gave an unparalleled impulse to the development of the idea of nationality.

Modern Germany, modern Italy, the new Kingdom of the Southern Slavs owe to Napoleon an immeasurable debt. Even the Swiss Confederation owes him something. The French Directory had attempted to impose upon Switzerland a unitarian form of government wholly alien to her traditions—the Helvetic Republic One and Indivisible.

### **Promotion of the Sense of Unity**

The Swiss made it quickly and abundantly clear that despite some tendencies towards national unity they repudiated the idea of uniformity; Napoleon recognized the fact, and in 1803 he gave them a new Constitution embodied in the Act of Mediation. That Act, though replaced in 1815 by the Federal Pact, marked a distinct step towards national unity in Switzerland. The degree of progress attained during the ten years when Switzerland was to all intents

and purposes a tributary of the Napoleonic Empire, may be measured by comparing the Federal Constitution of 1848 with the loose Confederation of Cantons which alone existed down to 1798.

Yugo-Slavia, too, owes a considerable debt to Napoleon. His occupation of the Illyrian provinces was due, of course, to motives far removed from any desire to stimulate national self-consciousness. But the introduction of the French codes, the regularisation of administration, the construction of roads, the establishment of schools—all this tended, however undesignedly, to promote among kindred peoples a sense of community, if not of nationality.

More conspicuous illustrations of the same tendency are to be found in Germany and Italy. In 1789, Germany contained no fewer than three hundred and sixty separate States each claiming quasi-sovereign rights and united only by the loosest possible tie of common allegiance to the shadowy survival still known as the Holy Roman Empire.

### **Disintegration and Redistribution**

Among none of these was there any real sense of national cohesion or unity. There were States powerful and petty in Germany, but "Germany" did not exist. The revolutionary wars accentuated the disintegration. The armies of the French Republic received a cordial welcome in the Rhine bishoprics, and in other western provinces; nor was there any protest when Prussia came to terms with France at Basel (1795), or when, two years later, Austria followed suit at Campo Formio. Both treaties involved the cession of German territory to France, both betrayed complete callousness on the part of the two leading German Powers as to the fate of the Empire as a whole. Austria and Prussia were alike intent only on the promotion of their own dynastic and territorial interests. The lesser princes of the Empire were not less selfish in their particularism, not more lacking in patriotism than the greater.

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Napoleon and Moreau brought Austria once more to her knees at Marengo and Hohenlinden respectively, 1800; and by the Treaty of Lunéville (1801) Austria confirmed the cession of the Rhineland to France. There then ensued a ludicrous and humiliating rush of German princelings to Paris, where, in order to secure the largest possible slice of the booty, each for each, all paid assiduous court to Talleyrand and his minions.

Napoleon's principles of redistribution were few and simple—to penalise Austria; to cajole Prussia; and, by enlarging and consolidating the territories of the secondary States, to bind them by ties of interest and gratitude more closely to France. Under the Act of Mediatisation, the States were reduced from three hundred and sixty to less than half that number. Of the fifty-one Imperial cities only six were permitted to survive. The old Circles of the Empire disappeared and all the ecclesiastical States, except one, were suppressed. Prussia got a large share of the spoils; so did Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Hesse-Kassel.

### **Sovereignty of the German Princes**

The Act of Mediatisation marked only a stage in Napoleon's journey. Austria was not yet completely crushed, the Holy Roman Empire still survived. Before Napoleon gave the final push to the tottering ruin, he prudently laid the foundations of the new edifice. In the autumn of 1805 he concluded treaties with the client States—Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg—by which they agreed to furnish, in the forthcoming campaign, contingents to the army of France. The Treaty of Pressburg (January 1, 1806) provided that the German princes should enjoy "complete and undivided sovereignty over their own States," and thus were finally shattered the last links which bound the princes to the old Empire. On July 17, 1806, the Treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine was signed in Paris. Charles of Dalberg,

Archbishop of Regensburg (Ratisbon) and Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg, the Elector of Baden, the Duke of Berg and the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, together with nine minor princes, definitely renounced their allegiance to the Empire, accepted the protection of Napoleon and pledged themselves to support him with arms.

### **End of the Holy Roman Empire**

On August 1 Napoleon—"the new Charlemagne" and in verity Emperor of the West—announced that he no longer recognized the existence of the "Germanic Confederation," and on August 6 the Emperor Francis, who two years earlier had assumed the entirely new title of Emperor of Austria, renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Thus, after an existence of just one thousand years, that hoary anachronism came to an end. But for Napoleon it might still be cumbering the earth.

The birth of the new German State, perhaps the most conspicuous illustration of the working of the national spirit in the modern world, was rendered possible only by the destruction of that Roman Empire which had for centuries strangled the incipient national life of Germany and had arrested the evolution of a Nation-State.

### **Colliding Forces Spread Confusion**

Events now moved rapidly. The annihilation of the Prussian power at Jena; her humiliation and dismemberment at Tilsit; the remaking of Prussia by Stein and Hardenberg, Scharnhorst and Humboldt; Napoleon's call to the Poles and the setting up of the Duchy of Warsaw; the attack upon Spain and the consequent reaction against the tyranny of Napoleon on nationalist lines; the addresses of Fichte to the German nation and their response in the War of Liberation; the overthrow of Napoleon's military power in the mighty battles of 1813-14—these things seemed to presage

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the early triumph of Nationalism in Germany. The hopes of the patriots were doomed to disappointment at Vienna, but they were triumphantly realized in 1870.

### **Napoleonic Reforms Sweep Italy**

The policy of Napoleon in Italy was parallel to a great extent with his policy in Germany. To Italy, as to Germany, he went at once as conqueror and as liberator. Italy at the close of the eighteenth century was even more devoid of the national spirit than Germany. Consisting of some fifteen separate States, dominated by the Hapsburgs in the north, by the Papacy and its "Legations" in the centre, by the Spanish Bourbons in Naples and Sicily, Italy had since the sixteenth century been little more than the cockpit of Europe. Deprived of civic independence, ignorant alike of political and social life, her people lay for the most part under alien rule—hopeless, emotionless and benumbed. Napoleon aroused them from their apathy. He reduced the political divisions of the country from fifteen to three; he introduced the Code Napoléon and unified the administration; he expelled the Jesuits and initiated educational reforms; he built bridges and made roads; above all, he taught the Italians to fight, and to fight not as Venetians, Lombards, or Neapolitans, but as Italians.

### **European Reaction and Unrest**

In Italy, as in Germany, the diplomats at Vienna attempted to wipe out all traces of Napoleon's work and to set back the hands of the political clock. It could not be done. There was indeed a temporary reaction towards separatism and autocracy. Dynastic influences were in the ascendant at Vienna; the principle of legitimacy enjoyed a temporary triumph; the idea of nationality was ignored. The reaction, however, was not of long duration. Within a very few years there were on every hand manifestations of

impatience with the policy of simple restoration and the naked reassertion of the principle of legitimacy.

In 1830 France gave the signal for a revolutionary outburst which, in one form or another, was reproduced in almost every country of continental Europe. But these movements, though they achieved something for constitutional liberty, did little to promote, except, perhaps, in Belgium, the principle of nationality. Far otherwise was it with the revolutions of 1848. In most countries, if not in all, a demand was put forward for an extension of popular liberties, but the predominant motive was unquestionably national. It was the alien character of Austrian rule which inspired Italians and Magyars and Czechs to raise the flag of insurrection against the Hapsburgs. It was a desire for national unity which brought to Frankfort representatives of every State in Germany, and led them to offer an Imperial Crown to Frederick William IV. of Prussia. The offer was declined.

### **Bismarck and Prussian Supremacy**

The Hohenzollern sovereign was so distrustful of the democratic temper of the Frankfort parliament as to postpone the realization of German unity. Moreover, he did not want to see Prussia merged in Germany. Ten years of reaction followed upon his refusal. Then Bismarck got his chance. He mistrusted parliamentary methods at least as much as Frederick William IV.; he believed that Germany must be welded together not by "parchments, votes, and speeches," but by blood and iron; above all, he was resolved that Prussia should not be merged in Germany, but that, on the contrary, Germany should be absorbed by Prussia.

The first step was to exclude the Hapsburgs with their conglomerate Empire from the Germanic body. The disputes about Schleswig-Holstein and the ensuing war with Denmark enabled him to fix a quarrel upon Austria which

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led to the Seven Weeks War, to the Prussian victory at Sadowa, to the exclusion of Austria from Germany, and to the break-up of the Bund which ever since 1815 had been powerless for everything but mischief. The dissolution of the Bund was followed by the formation (1867) of a North German Confederation under the presidency of the King of Prussia. Only the States north of the Main were originally members of the new Confederation, which was far more closely knit—more genuinely federal in character—than the old, but provision was made for the admission of the southern States, if and when they should desire it.

### **Establishment of the German Empire**

How long they might have held aloof from union with North Germany it is impossible to say, had not Napoleon III. played straight into Bismarck's hands. The ineptitude of his diplomacy after 1867 not only broke the traditional tie between France, particularly Bonapartist France, and the South German States, but, in 1870, flung them into the arms of Prussia. When France was manoeuvred by Bismarck into a declaration of war upon Prussia the Hohenzollerns found themselves, for the first time, at the head of a united Germany. After the crushing defeat of the French armies and the humiliating surrender at Sedan, Bismarck had little difficulty in converting the North German Confederation of 1867 into the Germanic Empire of 1871, an Empire which included every State of the Fatherland save only the German part of Austria.

If the unification of Germany affords the most imposing manifestation of the national spirit, the unification of Italy is the most romantic. Nothing did so much as the success of that movement to give popularity to the doctrine of the rights of nationalities. Many factors contributed to that success: the administrative uniformity of the Napoleonic regime, the pure-hearted enthusiasm of Mazzini, the high statesmanship

and brilliant diplomacy of Cavour, the steadfastness of the House of Savoy, the romantic knight-errantry of Garibaldi.

### **France Furthered the Italian Cause**

Nor was the cause of Italy unfavoured by external circumstances: the outbreak of the Crimean War, the intervention of Sardinia on the side of the allies, an intervention apparently fortuitous, but in reality inspired by high and far-sighted statesmanship, and the opportunity thus given to and seized by Cavour to put the whole Italian case before the diplomats assembled at Paris. At Paris Cavour met Napoleon III., and of that meeting the pact of Plombières was the result. Napoleon had a real apprehension of the principle of nationality, and his sympathy for the Italian cause was, perhaps, as nearly genuine and altruistic as any of the emotions which stirred that complex personality. The intervention of France in the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 was of incomparable service to Italy at a most critical juncture of her history. Hardly less important to Italy, though wholly self-regarding, was the diplomacy of Bismarck. His anxiety to isolate Austria induced him to offer Venetia to Victor Emmanuel, and Austria was compelled by Sadowa to give it up.

### **Mazzini Sows the Seed of Unity**

The actual stages on the road towards unity may be rapidly indicated. The stage between the insurrections of 1820 and the revolutions of 1848 was merely preliminary, though far from unimportant. During that period Mazzini sowed the seed, but he did little to help in reaping the subsequent harvest. The first definite advance was registered in 1860, when the States of Central Italy—Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and the Romagna—united themselves by plebiscite with the new Kingdom of North Italy. The credit of that achievement was due almost wholly to Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, though Napoleon's help was timely and substantial.

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It involved, however, the painful sacrifice of Nice and Savoy. But the significant transference of the Italian capital from Turin to Florence (1865) brought Italy a step nearer Rome.

### Garibaldi and His "Thousand"

The next stage—the union of North and South Italy—was accomplished less by diplomacy than by knighthood. In 1860 the Sicilians were encouraged by Mazzini to revolt against the tyranny of Bombino (Francis II.). Garibaldi and his "Thousand" flew to their assistance from Genoa, and within a few weeks had made themselves masters of the island and, under the unavowed protection of English guns, had crossed the narrow straits to Naples.

The Bourbon power crumbled almost as quickly in Naples as in Sicily, but after the conquest of Naples a critical moment occurred when Garibaldi declared that he would annex the southern kingdoms to the Kingdom of North Italy only when he could confer the gift upon Victor Emmanuel in Rome.

### Diplomacy and Knight-Errantry

Cavour knew that an advance upon Rome at this moment might have jeopardised all that had been achieved in the recent past as well as the promise of the immediate future. An army was hurriedly dispatched from Florence with the two-fold object of defending the Romagna against the Papal troops and of obstructing the advance of the Garibaldians upon Rome. Both purposes were achieved. On September 18, 1860, the Sardinian army met and routed the Papal troops at Castelfidardo, and ten days later compelled General Lamoricière to surrender at Ancona. Their next task was to deal with the Garibaldians. Garibaldi, flushed with victory, was in obstinate mood, but good sense prevailed. Garibaldi abandoned his march upon Rome, laid the crown of the two Sicilies at the feet of his Sovereign, and on November 7 Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi

entered Naples in triumph and in amity. Unity was almost achieved; but in the two sides of Italy there were still two gaping wounds. Austria, as we have already seen, was compelled by Bismarck to surrender Venetia to Italy in 1867, but the Trentino, with its Italian population, was left in Austrian hands, and there was bequeathed to the future an Adriatic problem the persistence of which cost Austria and Germany dear in 1915. From 1867 down to the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920 the claim to *Italia Irredenta*, the passionate desire to unite to United Italy these lands upon the shores of the Adriatic which are either predominantly Italian in population or, owing to their sometime inclusion in the domains of Venetia, are culturally Italian, was the most potent force in the external politics of Italy.

### Conflict Between Vatican and Quirinal

Of problems which may be regarded as domestic, undoubtedly the most difficult has been the relations of the new Italian Kingdom and the Papacy. Both disputants command sympathy and respect. The House of Savoy accurately interpreted a feeling well-nigh universal among the Italians of the Risorgimento in its resolution to make Rome the capital of United Italy. No other capital was indeed conceivable. On the other hand it is impossible to ignore the strength of the Papal case. For nearly two thousand years the Pope had administered his world-empire from the unassailed security of the Petrine rock. Was not a base of territorial independence, the possession of a temporal sovereignty, essential to the international or super-national position of his spiritual kingdom? The House of Savoy had, however, no choice. The Prussian attack upon France in 1870 compelled Napoleon to withdraw the French garrison from Rome, and after a feint of resistance from the Papal troops, Victor Emmanuel occupied Rome, and the Pope became henceforward the

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“prisoner of the Vatican.” The occupation of Rome was the crown of the Italian Risorgimento; it marked the final triumph of the most romantic among the national movements of the nineteenth century.

Not that romance was by any means absent from the national movements in the Near East. For four hundred years the Ottoman Turks had been encamped upon European soil. Alien in creed, in race, in social custom and political tradition from the peoples of the Balkan peninsula, they had never absorbed nor even attempted to absorb the indigenous inhabitants; still less were they absorbed by them. But for the fact that they were the votaries of a religion inferior only to Christianity they would probably, like the Teutonic conquerors of Gaul, have yielded to the claims of a higher civilization and a purer creed. As it was they superimposed themselves (much as the English have done in India) upon Serbs, Greeks, Bulgars, and Rumanians, neither absorbing them nor wiping them out. The subjugated peoples disappeared from sight, almost from memory, for four hundred years; but as the tide of Turkish conquest receded, as the government of the Porte sank into greater and greater decrepitude, the submerged peoples re-emerged.

### **Portent of the Greek Insurrection**

Of the principal nations in the Balkans, three—the Serbs, the Bulgars, and the Greeks—could nourish and sustain the sentiment of nationality by an appeal to the memories of the past. The fourth, the Rumanians, proudly claimed descent from the Roman colony planted by Trajan in Dacia.

The insurrection of the Greeks in 1821 was a portent in the history of the modern world. Not only did it challenge the Turkish sovereignty in the heart of the Empire, but it challenged it definitely in the name of a new doctrine, the doctrine that nationalities, like individuals, possess “rights.”

If the Greeks had become tardily conscious of this principle, the fact was due partly to the large measure of local autonomy conceded by the Ottomans to the conquered races, partly to the classical revival of the eighteenth century, partly to the stirring of stagnant waters by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, but most of all to the devoted and patriotic labours of the parish priests. Never did any movement display a more confused and perplexing medley of brutality and nobility, of conspicuous heroism and consummate cowardice, of pure-minded patriotism and sordid individualism, of self-sacrificing loyalty and time-serving treachery.

### **Victory for Freedom and Justice**

Yet who, as Mr. Gladstone once asked, can doubt that it was on the whole a “noble stroke struck for freedom and for justice”? But for the opportune outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, but for the cordial sympathy of England and France, but for the “untoward accident” of Navarino, the Greeks might have been compelled to yield; their success added to the polity of Europe the first of the new Nation-States.

The Danubian Principalities owed their emancipation to the Crimean War, and their union to the ardour with which Napoleon had espoused the doctrine of nationality. The official acceptance of Serbia and Bulgaria as virtually independent Nation-States may be dated from the insurrection movement of 1875-76, and from the Treaty of Berlin, in which the results of that movement were registered.

### **Nationality in the Balkans**

The enduring significance of that treaty consists not, as contemporaries imagined, as indeed its authors supposed, in the new definition of the relations between Russia and Turkey; not in the remnant of the European domains of the Ottoman Empire snatched from the brink of

## National Spirit

destruction by Lord Beaconsfield, but in the new Nation-States that arose on the ruins of that Empire. The nationality principle may be as elusive as you will, but whatever its essential ingredients none can doubt that it is in the Balkan peninsula that it has manifested its existence most clearly and most unmistakably demonstrated its force.

### Nationality in the New World

Not least in virtue of negation. The Balkan Settlement left Crete, the "Great Greek Island" under the heel of the Turk; it left the Rumanians of Bessarabia in the hands of Russia, those of Transylvania and the Bukovina in the hands of Austria, and by Bismarck's encouragement of the *Drang nach Osten* of his Hapsburg allies, it added the southern Slavs of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to the medley of peoples who sulkily acknowledged the rule of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The Great War of 1914-18 was implicit in the "settlement" of 1878.

The nationality principle has demonstrated its potency in the New World no less conclusively than in the old. How far it has been responsible for moulding the destinies of the States which have arisen in South America upon the ruins of the empires of Portugal and Spain it is difficult to decide, but the Republics of Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico, to mention no other, exhibit many if not all the attributes of genuine Nation-States.

### Evolution of the United States

As to the United States of America there is no ambiguity. The great Republic absorbs with astonishing ease and rapidity men of all nations, creeds and tongues, all peoples in fact, save those who are descended from the African negroes who first served the economic needs of the planters of the southern states. But for the prolonged and heroic efforts put forth by the northern states in the Civil War there would now be at least two

Nation-States, if not more, within the area occupied by the forty-eight states of the American Union; as it is, there has evolved one great Nation-State, extending geographically from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the shores of the St. Lawrence to those of the Gulf of Mexico.

To the north of the United States there is rapidly evolving another nation, whose position becomes day by day less ambiguous. If there is any lack of definition in the status of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, it arises from the fact that as constituent states in the British Commonwealth they present to the political analyst a wholly new type of polity. The British Commonwealth is at present something less than a *Bundesstaat*, it is something more than a *Staatenbund*. To which of the two forms it will ultimately adhere it is premature to predict. On the one hand the Great Dominions are rapidly developing a sense of individual nationalism.

### Polity of the British Commonwealth

They have claimed a place in the League of Nations which is hardly consistent with any semblance of imperial connexion; Canada has asserted her right to separate diplomatic representation at Washington, and the spirit of individualism, stimulated, no doubt, by the heroic part played by the sons of the Empire in the Great War, has so dominated the Dominions that they hesitated to accept the designation of "Imperial Cabinet" for the meeting of the Prime Ministers lest it should commit to common executive action the cabinets of the constituent states, cabinets which are, of course, severally responsible to their own Dominion legislatures. On the other hand, the Dominions are supremely and most reasonably anxious for a voice in the determination of that foreign policy the principles and the success of which are momentously significant to them.

Such a voice could not, however, be claimed by, still less be conceded to,

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any state which did not share the common burden of imperial defence or failed to realize the responsibilities as well as the privileges incidental to integral partnership in an organic whole. The citizens of the great Dominions may be said, therefore, to possess a dual nationality as they acknowledge a two-fold allegiance. Primarily Canadians, South Africans, Australians and New Zealanders, as the case may be, they are also British subjects, citizens of one Commonwealth, subjects of one King.

The survey attempted in the preceding pages, cursory though it necessarily be, serves at least to illustrate the complexity of the conceptions combined in the term *Nationality* and the difficulties attendant upon precise definition. It should serve also to point a moral to enforce a warning. Phrases are the pitfalls of the half-educated, the despair of scholarship and science. Formulae are the refuge of the politician, but anathema to the statesman.

### **The Unit of "Self-Determination"**

Nationalities may have "rights," and it may be desirable to defer to the principle of "self-determination," but the man who would penetrate from phrases to realities will be curious to ascertain where the sanction of those "rights" may lie, and what is the precise unit which is entitled to invoke the principle of "self-determination." The latter question is crucial. Self-determination for Great Britain might, for example, involve the denial of the privilege to Scotland or Wales, self-determination for Bavaria might mean its denial to Germany. Everything turns upon the selection of the unit. Professor Zimmern goes so far as to affirm that "self-determination is not a principle of Liberalism but of Bolshevism." Without entering upon a discussion so obviously apt to provoke controversy, it may be said that while, in a general sense, the privilege or right or principle will be denied by no reasonable man, the application of it in particular cases will frequently raise

difficulties so great as to reduce the practical value of the principle to little more than the realization of an abstract formula.


One question remains. The nation-state is the typical formation of the modern world. Is it likely to be a permanent formation? Is it the final goal of international evolution, or a transitory stage? One thing must be said at once. Nationalism may make for liberty—it affords no security for peace.

### **The Ideal State Formation**

No one who can estimate the debt which mankind owes to the city-states of ancient Hellas or to the republics of medieval Italy will ever seek to depreciate either the political or the cultural value of small political communities. But the conditions under which the Greek experiments were made were peculiar, and the city-states neither promoted peace nor preserved their own existence. To the small nations, too, the world owes a heavy debt. But the small Nation-State is in the modern world a complete anachronism. If it survives it will survive as an exotic in ungenial soil. The ideal formation is, as Lord Acton seems to suggest, the coexistence of several Nations under the same State.

### **Where Hope for the Future Lies**

This, as he points out, affords "a test as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilization" ("Freedom," p. 290.). Happy is the State which, with contentment to each, includes many Nations; and well is it for the peace of the world if there be great Commonwealths which comprehend within their ample borders many self-governing States. In the extension of the federal formation, with due provision for variety of detail, lies the best hope for the political future of mankind.



FINE SPECIMENS OF AN ABORIGINAL RACE OF AMERICA

Slight figures with well formed but not muscular limbs, Mongoloid features, long, dark hair evenly trimmed, and skin of red cinnamon hue are characteristics of the true or "red" Carib Indians. The heart of South America was the cradle of their race. Aforetime cannibals, they were settled in Guiana and in the islands of the Caribbean Sea when Columbus discovered the New World.

*Photo, Sir H. H. Johnston*